Deng and Liu released the PLAN from MaoвЂ™s exclusively defensive strategy of striking only after being struck. As Central Military Commission chairman, Deng Xiaoping cabled his personal congratulations on their victory to all the units deployed in the PLANвЂ™s first sea battle under the new strategy.Дuring Liu HuaqingвЂ™s command, the PLANвЂ™s rising sea power moved China to adopt a more proactive and offensive regional posture. The PLANвЂ™s first major battle with the Vietnam PeopleвЂ™s Navy in the South China Sea took place shortly thereafter in March 1988. The Central Military Commission and the PLA General Staff Department promulgated LiuвЂ™s concept as the new national maritime strategy in 1987. In his memoirs Liu records that following a comprehensive review of ChinaвЂ™s maritime strategy and naval forces, Deng directed the commanders of the PLAN to develop a unified maritime strategy of вЂњactive defenseвЂќ in the вЂњnear seas,вЂќ and to build вЂњa powerful navy with a capacity to fight modern warfare.вЂќ According to an official Chinese profile of Liu, he charged the PLAN вЂњto live up to the historic responsibility to grow rapidly up into a major power in the Pacific area in order to secure the smooth progress of ChinaвЂ™s economic modernization.вЂќ He warned that failure in this mission would cause China to вЂњlag behind again in the new wave of technology revolution, and eventually be thrown out of history.вЂќД«y the mid-1980s, Liu had established вЂњactive defense, near seas operationsвЂќ as the governing concept in ChinaвЂ™s naval strategy. Loss of face and thousands of PLA casualties spurred Deng and Liu to modernize ChinaвЂ™s military and thereby regain Chinese primacy in maritime Southeast Asia. At an expanded meeting of the Central Military Commission in 1975, Deng Xiaoping excoriated ChinaвЂ™s armed forces for being вЂњoverstaffed, lazy, arrogant, ill-equipped, and ill-prepared to conduct modern warfare.вЂќ The PLAвЂ™s intervention in Vietnam at the start of the Third Indochina War (1978-91) revealed the significant deficiencies in ChinaвЂ™s military forces and strategy. Together they would confront and reform a deficient maritime strategy and capability. Defense Intelligence Agency profile, Liu commanded the development of Chinese maritime strategy and sea power until the late-1990s. Widely held as BeijingвЂ™s вЂњpreeminent expert on military related research and development, technology acquisition, and equipment modernisation,вЂќ according to a U.S. Rising uniquely to general in the PLA and admiral in the PLAN, Liu Huaqing was charged by Deng with responsibility for steering the development of the new maritime strategy, and the concomitant reformation of ChinaвЂ™s sea power.

The campaign to engage foreign participation in ChinaвЂ™s offshore oil industry was also conceived and directed by Deng.

He served as chief of the General Staff (1977-80) and chairman of the Central Military Commission (1981-88) at the time of the PLANвЂ™s first major battle with the Vietnam PeopleвЂ™s Navy. To understand the current strategy, it is essential to understand the history of its conception and formative conduct under its two principal architects: Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997) and Liu Huaqing (1916-2011).Дeng Xiaoping held joint command at the Central Military Commission during the planning and execution of the PeopleвЂ™s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) operation to seize control of the Paracel Islands from the Republic of Vietnam in 1974. Under these conditions, China has developed a maritime strategy based on preemption and proactive influence operations. Furthermore, as Alastair Iain Johnston has observed, ChinaвЂ™s distinct вЂњoperational strategic culture predisposes those socialized in it to act more coercively against an enemy as relative capabilities become more favourable.вЂќ

If Beijing should now lose face and claimed sovereign territory in the South China Sea to a relatively small country or a cooperative of medium-sized maritime powers it would vitiate the Communist PartyвЂ™s precarious political contract. The Chinese Communist PartyвЂ™s mandate to govern 1.35 billion people is founded on its promise to restore the Middle Kingdom to a prime position in the regional and global order. The concept of вЂњfaceвЂќ exerts powerful agency in Chinese interpersonal relations, foreign affairs, and maritime strategy.

Battle islands defense strategy